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AGENCY ACTION, FINALITY AND GEOGRAPHICAL NEX-
US: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH
NEPA'S PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT REQUIREMENT AFTER LUJAN V. NATIONAL
WILDLIFE FEDERATION
Matthew C. Porterfield
I. -INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition of
the need to address the complex and interrelated impacts that
result from human interaction with the environment.1 One of
the most effective tools for evaluating these impacts has been
the preparation of programmatic environmental impact state-
ments2 (EISs) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA). The status of programmatic EISs,
* BA., 1986, University of Vermont; J.D., 1990, Vermont Law School. Mr.
Porterfield is an attorney with the Law Offices of Edward Lee Rogers, a Washington,
D.C. firm which specializes in environmental law.
1. See ALBERT GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 2 (1992). The Vice President wrote:
The ecological perspective begins with a view of the whole, an under-
standing of how the various parts of nature interact in patterns that
tend toward balance and persist over time. But this perspective cannot
treat the earth as something separate from human civilization; we are
part of the whole too, and looking at it ultimately means also looking at
ourselves. And if we do not see that the human part of nature has an
increasingly powerful influence over the whole of nature-that we are, in
effect, a natural force just like the winds and the tides-then we will not
be able to see how dangerously we are threatening to push the earth out
of balance.
Id. See also United States Dep't of Agric. Forest Serv., Proceedings of the Nat'l Work-
shop: Taking an Ecological Approach to Management (Apr. 27-30, 1992).
2. Although the terms "programmatic environmental impact statement" and "pro-
grammatic EIS" are used throughout this article, the courts also refer to a program-
matic EIS as a "comprehensive impact statement" (Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390, 409 (1976)), a "cumulative EIS" (Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 803 F.2d
466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986)), or a "generic environmental impact statement" (Natural Re-
sources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.
1976)).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988). See generally Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and
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however, has been called into question by the Supreme Court's
decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,4 which has
been interpreted by numerous commentators as heralding the
end of "programmatic" environmental lawsuits.' Even more
significantly, Lujan has been cited by some courts declining to
review federal agency actions with widespread environmental
impacts.' In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that an environ-
mental advocacy organization lacked standing to challenge the
Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) administration of the
"land withdrawal review program" under which the agency
determined which federal lands under its administration would
be available for mining and other commercial uses.7 Although
several years have passed since the Court decided the case, ex-
actly what type of "programmatic" lawsuits are ostensibly pre-
cluded under Lujan remains unclear.
The uncertainty over the implications of Lujan exists to some
extent because both commentators and courts that have de-
the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on the Public Lands, 25 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 43 (1990).
4. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
5. See Stephen M. Macfarlane, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation:
Standing, the APA, and the Future of Environmental Litigation, 54 ALB. L. REv. 863,
921 (1990); Jonathan Poisner, Comment, Environmental Values and Judicial Review
After Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLO-
GY L.Q. 335, 352 (1991); Sarah A. Robichaud, Note, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Federation: The Supreme Court Tightens the Reins on Standing for Environmental
Groups, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 443, 473 (1991); Edward B. Sears, Note, Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation: Environmental Plaintiffs are Tripped up on Standing, 24
CONN. L. REv. 293, 355-59 (1991); Karin Sheldon, Note, NWF v. Lujan: Justice Scalia
Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10,577, 10,558 (1990); see also Barnett M. Lawrence, Standing for Environ-
mental Groups: An Overview and Recent Developments in the D.C. Circuit, 19 Envtl L.
Rev. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,289, 10,297 (1989) (predicting, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Lujan, an increased burden on environmental plaintiffs challenging pro-
grammatic government actions).
6. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85-87 (D.C. Cir.
1991); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C.
1992); Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (D. Mont. 1991); see also
City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 494
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (declining review on other grounds but interpreting Lujan to impose
a more stringent standard for review of agency actions with widespread environmen-
tal impacts); Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 756 (D. Haw. 1990) (de-
clining review on other grounds but interpreting Lujan as imposing a more stringent
standard for review of agency actions with widespread environmental impacts).
7. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 885-900.
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clined to review actions with broad environmental implications
have failed to define what they mean by "programmatic" envi-
ronmental lawsuits. The confusion is compounded by the court's
application of three separate doctrines in precluding review: the
need to identify reviewable "agency action" under section 702 of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 the requirement that
the agency action be "final agency action" pursuant to section
704 of the APA,9 and the necessity under section 702 and Arti-
cle III of the Constitution'0 that a plaintiff alleging injury to
her use and enjoyment of land demonstrate a "geographical
nexus" to that land.
The conclusion that environmental organizations or individual
citizens generally may not obtain judicial review of entire feder-
al agency "programs," as defined by either the prospective
plaintiffs or the federal agencies themselves, is unremarkable.
The courts have traditionally been reluctant to review broad
patterns of conduct and instead have insisted that plaintiffs
identify particular instances of allegedly illegal conduct directly
affecting them." Conversely, the Lujan Court explicitly
acknowledged that an individual adversely affected by a regula-
tion promulgated by an agency may obtain judicial review of
that regulation, and that if the regulation is struck down it will
be invalidated for all parties, regardless of how widespread the
environmental implications of the regulation are."
8. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III.
11. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 (1984) (suits by parties not
directly affected by the allegedly illegal conduct challenging the "programs agencies
establish to carry out their legal obligations . . . are rarely if ever appropriate for
federal-court adjudication"); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (the Supreme Court
"has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance' which
amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and most appropriately ad-
dressed in the representative branches") (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-
500 (1975)).
One notable exception, however, is the area of civil rights law, which permits
plaintiffs to challenge a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory employment practices
by an employer, including a federal agency. See E. Gates Garrity-Rokous, Preserving
Review of Undeclared Programs: A Statutory Redefinition of Final Agency Action, 101
YALE L.J. 643, 657-58 & n.99 (1991) (discussing § 707(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-6(a) (1988)). Cf Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988) (providing for civil suits
against "a pattern of racketeering activity").
12. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-91 n.2; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1994) (defining
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The status of programmatic EISs, however, remains in ques-
tion." This article suggests that Lujan did not eliminate judi-
cial review of agency compliance with NEPA's programmatic
EIS requirement, and that when the nature of the agency ac-
tion subject to review under NEPA is properly understood, the
agency action, finality, and geographical nexus issues should
not significantly impede the ability of environmental plaintiffs
to obtain such review.
Section I of this article provides a brief overview of NEPA
and the programmatic EIS requirement. Section II reviews the
basic principles of standing and reviewable agency action which
affect environmental plaintiffs' ability to obtain judicial review
of federal agency actions affecting the environment. Section IH
examines the Supreme Court's holding and rationale in Lujan.
Section IV analyzes implications of the Lujan decision for plain-
tiffs attempting to obtain judicial review of agency compliance
with the programmatic EIS requirement and concludes that the
Lujan decision, properly understood, should not unduly increase
the burden on such plaintiffs.
I. NEPA AND THE PROGRAMMATIC EIS REQUIREMENT
A. NEPA
NEPA was enacted with the ambitious objectives of
"encourag[ing] productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment; . . . promot[ing] efforts which will prevent
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
stimulat[ing] the health and welfare of man; [and] enrich[ing]
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural re-
sources important to the Nation ... ."' In order to achieve
reviewable agency action to include agency rules); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 913 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167, 170 (1967); Abbot Lab. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
13. See Poisner supra note 5, at 366; see also Sears, supra note 5, at 357 ("the
[Lujan] Court either overruled sub silento, or did not heed, the NEPA's requirement
of [programmatic EISs]").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988) (declaring policy
of the federal government to "create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans").
[Vol. 28:619622
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these goals, NEPA contains several "action forcing"" proce-
dures. 6 The most significant of these procedures 7 is con-
tained in section 102(2)(C), which states that "to the fullest
extent possible" all federal agencies are required to prepare an
EIS on every legislative proposal "and other major Federal
actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment . . . ."" The EIS must describe the potential environ-
mental impacts of the proposed action," any unavoidable ad-
verse environmental impacts of the action,20 any alternatives
to the proposed action,2' "the relationship between local short-
term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity,"22  and any "irrevers-
ible ... commitments of resources"' which would result from
the action.
The Supreme Court has noted that preparation of an EIS
promotes NEPA's broad environmental objectives in two impor-
tant ways:
It ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision [on the
proposed action], will have available and will carefully con-
sider detailed information concerning significant environ-
mental impacts; it also guarantees that the relevant infor-
mation will be made available to the larger audience that
15. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 348 (1989);
see also Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979); Kieppe v. Sierra Club, 427
U.S. 390, 409 & n.18 (1976).
16. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (describing NEPA's duties as "essentially procedural").
17. See, e.g., Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmnidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir.
1980) (describing the preparation of the EIS as NEPA's "primary" procedural require-
ment).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Other procedural obligations imposed on federal
agencies by NEPA include the obligation to use an interdisciplinary approach to plan-
ning and decisionmaking which may have environmental impacts, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(A), to develop alternatives to any proposals which involve potentially conflict-
ing uses of resources, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E), to cooperate in international environ-
mental efforts when consistent with United States foreign policy, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(F), and to provide environmental advice and information to the states, local
governments, and members of the public, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(G).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). Only "reasonable alternatives" need be discussed in
detail. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14, 1508.25(b)(2) (1992).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(v).
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may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process
and the implementation of that decision.'
The EIS requirement, however, is purely procedural-federal
agencies are not required to pursue the environmentally prefer-
able course of actionY.2  As the Supreme Court has noted, "[ilf
the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action are
adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not con-
strained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the
environmental costs." 26 Thus, the harm that results from non-
compliance with NEPA's EIS requirement is not the actual
harm to the environment, but rather the increased risk that
environmental harm will occur because of uninformed agency
decisionmaking.27
24. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989); see
also Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(citing Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97 (1983)) (noting the dual purposes of NEPA are the following: (1) to in-
form Congress, interested agencies and members of the public of the environmental
consequences of the proposed actions that may significantly affect the environment,
and (2) to ensure that agencies factor environmental values into their consideration of
such proposed actions)); Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,
499 F.2d 502, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (purpose of environmental impact statements "is to
ensure 'meaningful consideration of environmental factors at all stage of agency
decisionmaking' and to inform both the public and agencies implicated at subsequent
stages of decisionmaking of the environmental costs of the proposal."); Atchison T.S.
& F. Railroad v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722, 730 (D.D.C. 1977), motions for summa-
ry judgment denied, 459 F. Supp. 188 (1978) and 480 F. Supp. 972 (1979), affd in
part sub nom. Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("NEPA
creates 'a statutory right or entitlement' to environmental information" among mem-
bers of the public).
25. See 490 U.S. at 349-50; Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444
U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam); Vermont Yankee Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S.
390, 410 n.21 (1976).
26. See 490 U.S. at 349.
27. See cases cited supra note 24; see also Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497,
500 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting the injury that results from noncompliance with NEPA is
"the added risk to the environment which takes place when governmental
decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with
prior public comment) of the likely effects of their decision upon the environment")
(emphasis in original); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (1993) ("[tlhe primary purpose of an envi-
ronmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the
policies and goals defined in the Act are infused into the ongoing programs and ac-
tions of the Federal Government"); Leslye A. Hermann, Injunctions for NEPA Viola-
tions: Balancing the Equities, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 1263, 1276 (1992) ("NEPA reduces
risk to the environment by requiring informed decisionmaking.").
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B. Programmatic EISs
NEPA itself contains no mention of programmatic EISs.1
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)29 Regulations
Implementing NEPA's Procedural Provisions, ° however, recog-
nize that in addition to site-specific projects"' such as dams 2
or highways,3 the types of "major Federal action" subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement include the following:
[aldoption of formal plans, such as official documents pre-
pared or approved by federal agencies which guide or pre-
scribe alternative uses of federal resources, upon which
future agency actions will be based ... [and] [aldoption of
programs, such as a group of concerted actions to imple-
ment a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected
agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a
specific statutory program or executive directive.34
The CEQ Regulations encourage the preparation of program-
matic EISs on federal actions which are related geographically,
generically (e.g. actions with common timing, implementation or
28. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988).
29. The creation of the CEQ was mandated by NEPA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 4342
(1988). The Council's primary duty is to advise the President on environmental is-
sues. See NEPA § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 4344.
30. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1993).
31. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(4) (1993).
32. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989);
Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Committee v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1976); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D.
Ark. 1970).
33. See, e.g., Lathan v. Brinegar, 506 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1974); Indian Lookout
Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); Dickman v. City of Sante Fe, 724 F.
Supp. 1341 (D.N.M. 1989); Falls Road Impact Comm., Inc. v. Dole, 581 F. Supp. 678
(E.D. Wis. 1984), affd per curiam, 737 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1984); Town of Matthews
v. Department of Transp., 527 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. N.C. 1981); Hawthorn Envtl.
Preservation Ass'n v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1976), affd 551 F.2d
1055 (5th Cir. 1977); Patterson v. Exon, 415 F. Supp. 1276 (D. Neb. 1976); Forty-
Seventh Street Improvement Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,162
(D. Colo. Jan. 8, 1973); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D.
Conn. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882 (W.D. Wisc. 1971), affd, 466 F.2d
1027 (7th Cir. 1972).
34. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(2)-(3) (1993) (emphasis added); see also 40 C.F.R. §
1502.4(b) (1993) ("lEinvironmental impact statements may be prepared, and are some-
times required, for broad Federal actions such as the adoption of new agency pro-
grams ....").
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subject matter) or by stage of technological development.'
Through a process called "tiering," programmatic EISs can be
used in conjunction with site-specific EISs or programmatic
EISs of lesser scope:
'"Tiering" refers to the coverage of general matters in broad-
er environmental impact statements (such as national pro-
gram or policy statements) with subsequent narrower state-
ments or environmental analyses (such as regional or basin-
wide program statements or ultimately site-specific state-
ments) incorporating by reference the general discussions
and concentrating solely on the issues specific to the state-
ment subsequently prepared . . 36
35. Section 1502.4 of the CEQ Regulations states:
When preparing statements on broad actions ... agencies may
find it useful to evaluate the proposal in one of the following ways:
(1) Geographically, including actions occurring in the same gen-
eral location, such as body of water, region, or metropolitan area.
(2) Generically, including actions which have relevant similar-
ities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of imple-
mentation, media, or subject matter.
(3) By stage of technological development including federal or
federally assisted research, development or demonstration programs for
new technologies which, if applied, could significantly affect the quali-
ty of the human environment. Statements shall be prepared on such
programs and shall be available before the program has reached a
stage of investment or commitment to implementation likely to de-
termine subsequent development or restrict later alternatives.
40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (1993); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(2) (1993) ("[c]umulative
actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant
impacts .. . should be discussed in the same impact statement"); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7
(1993).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1992).
Agencies are encouraged to tier their environmental impact statements to
eliminate repetitive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the
actual issues ripe for decision at each level of environmental review (40
C.F.R. § 1508.28). Whenever a broad environmental impact statement has
been prepared (such as a program or policy statement) and a subsequent
statement or environmental assessment is then prepared on an action
included within the entire program or policy (such as a site specific ac-
tion) the subsequent statement or environmental assessment need only
summarize the issues specific to the subsequent action. The subsequent
document shall state where the earlier document is available. Tiering
may also be appropriate for different stages of actions ....
40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (1993).
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The CEQ's Regulations, including the programmatic EIS
requirement, were issued pursuant to an Executive Order
charging CEQ with the lead role in implementing NEPA and
authorizing CEQ to issue regulations which are binding on all
federal agencies.17 The Supreme Court has recognized that the
CEQ's Regulations are entitled to substantial deference by the
courts."
C. The Kieppe Decision
The Supreme Court endorsed the concept of programmatic
EISs in Kleppe v. Sierra Club.39 In Kleppe, several environ-
mental organizations brought suit challenging the failure of the
Department of the Interior ("DOI") to prepare a "comprehensive
environmental impact statement" on its actions related to the
development of coal reserves on federally owned or controlled
land in an area identified by the plaintiffs as the "Northern
Great Plains region."0  The plaintiffs alleged that their
members' use and enjoyment of the region was threatened by
coal-related operations and sought both declaratory relief and
an injunction prohibiting the DOI from taking any action to
37. See Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-1970), reprinted as amended
in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
38. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 372 (1989);
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. at 355 (1989); Andrus v. Sier-
ra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (citations omitted).
39. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). A few lower federal courts had previously sanctioned the
programmatic EIS requirement. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976) (requiring preparation of a 'generic"
EIS addressing cumulative environmental impacts of licensing of mixed uranium and
plutonium fuel for commercial use); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway,
524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975) (requiring preparation of an EIS addressing cumulative
impacts of U.S. Navy dumping of polluted sludge in Long Island Sound); Scientists'
Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring preparation of an EIS on liquid metal fast breeder reactor
program); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (holding an EIS prepared on proposed oil development of a region on the outer
continental shelf inadequate); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 382
F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974) (requiring preparation of programmatic EIS on expansion
of Upper Mississippi navigation system); see also Patrick E. Barney, The Program-
matic Environmental Impact Statement and the National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1981).
40. Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 395. The "Northern Great Plains region" as identified in
the plaintiffs' complaint encompassed a coal-rich region including parts of Wyoming,
Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota. Id. at 396.
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permit the further development of coal reserves pending com-
pletion of the EIS.4 The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granted the federal defendants' motion for
summary judgment,42 holding that no proposal existed for a
regional program to develop coal reserves in the area identified
by the plaintiffs.' The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed and enjoined the DOI's
approval of four mining plans in the region of concern." The
court of appeals did not dispute the district court's conclusion
that there was no proposal for a regional program. Instead, the
court of appeals concluded that even though there had been no
formal proposal for a regional program, the DOI had "contem-
plated" such a program, and, consequently the court of appeals
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether a
regional EIS was required under a four-part balancing test.45
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the court of appeals'
reasoning that NEPA sometimes requires EISs for merely "con-
templated" actions.46 The Court held that there was no propos-
al for major federal action with regard to the Northern Great
Plains Region triggering the EIS requirement.47 The Court not-
ed that the DOI had prepared a "Coal Programmatic EIS" on
its entire proposed national coal-leasing program as well as
41. Id. at 395.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 395, 400.
44. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
45. The court of appeals identified the following four factors:
[1] How likely is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that
occur? [2] To what extent is meaningful information presently available
on the effects of implementation of the program, and of alternatives and
their effects? [3] To what extent are irretrievable commitments being
made and options precluded as refinement of the proposal progresses? [4]
How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is imple-
mented?
Morton, 514 F.2d at 880.
46. 427 U.S. at 403-15.
47. Id. at 399.
48. Id. at 400. The Court observed:
[T]he federal petitioners agreed at oral argument that § 102(2)(C) re-
quired the Coal Programmatic EIS that was prepared in tandem with the
new national coal-leasing program and included as part of the final re-
port on the proposal for adoption of that program .... Their admission
is well made, for the new leasing program is a coherent plan of national
scope, and its adoption surely has significant environmental consequences.
628
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EISs on individual decisions which affected coal mining-such
as the issuance of right-of-way permits and the approval of
mining plans49 -in the region of interest to the plaintiffs.50
Nonetheless, the Court concluded:
[Tihere is no evidence in the record of an action or a pro-
posal for an action of regional scope. The District Court, in
fact, expressly found that there was no existing or proposed
plan or program on the part of the Federal Government for
the regional development of the area described in respond-
ents' complaint .... [The district court also] found no evi-
dence that the individual coal development projects under-
taken or proposed by private industry and public utilities in
that part of the country are integrated into a plan or other-
wise interrelated. These findings were not disturbed by the
Court of Appeals, and they remain fully supported by the
record in this Court.51
Significantly, the Supreme Court declined to require the DOI
to prepare an EIS on a program which was merely contemplat-
ed. The Court indicated, however, that a programmatic EIS
would be required if a proposal for programmatic action existed:
"[Wihen several proposals for ... actions that will have cumu-
lative or synergistic environmental impact[s] ... are pending
concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequenc-
es must be considered together. Only through comprehensive
consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate
different courses of action." 2 The DOI apparently recognized
the need for programmatic EISs since, in addition to individual
EISs on local decisions, it had also prepared a national pro-
grammatic EIS to address the cumulative impacts of those
Id.
49. The Court noted that several federal courts of appeals have held that such
decisions to permit private activities that have significant environmental impact are
subject to NEPA's EIS requirement. Kieppe, 427 U.S. at 399 (citing Scientists' Inst.
for Pub. Info., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1088-89
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972)).
50. Id. at 397-98, 400.
51. Id. at 400-01.
52. Id. at 410; see also id. at 409 (stating that section 102(2)(C) of NEPA may
require a comprehensive impact statement in certain situations where several pro-
posed actions are pending at the same time); id. at 413 ("Cumulative environmental
impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement.").
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individual decisions.53 Moreover, the Kleppe Court made it
clear that it viewed the DOI's decision not to prepare a regional
programmatic EIS as final agency action subject to judicial
review.54
Similarly, the lower federal courts have either required the
preparation of or reviewed programmatic EISs prepared on a
variety of federal actions,55  including forest management
plans,55 a regional water marketing plan,5 7 the licensing of
mixed uranium and plutonium fuel for commercial use, 8 the
granting of mining permits in national parks in Alaska, 9 the
issuance of rules concerning handicapped access to mass tran-
sit,"0 the ocean dumping of dredged material,61 the revision of
the national plan for the development of public airports,62 a
regional power development program,63 nuclear waste manage-
53. Id. at 412-13.
54. Id. at 408-09. "[it also is possible to view the [plaintiffs'] argument as an
attack upon the decision of the petitioners not to prepare one comprehensive impact
statement on all proposed projects in the region. This contention properly is before
us, for the petitioners have made it clear they do not intend to prepare such a state-
ment." Id.
Several commentators have suggested that the Court's review in Kieppe of an
agency decision not to prepare an EIS under the permissive arbitrary and capricious
standard constituted a major setback for NEPA litigation. See, e.g., FRANK GRAD,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 9.02, at 9-108.2, 9-110, 9-113, 9-114 (1993); DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, NEPA LAw AND LITIGATION § 9.03, at 5-6 (Supp. 1991). Agency
decisionmaking under NEPA, however, is normally only subject to the arbitrary and
capricious standard. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S.
360, 375-78 & n.23 (1989).
55. The preparation of programmatic EISs sometimes allows federal agencies to
avoid doing site specific EISs. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Hodel, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987); Park County Resource Council, Inc. v. United
States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987). But see Sierra Club v. Penfold,
664 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Alaska 1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988).
56. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993); Sierra Club
v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
57. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1979).
58. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976).
59. Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20244 (D. Alaska 1985), affd, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
60. American Pub. Transit Ass'n. v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
61. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Benn, 491 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
62. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Adams, 434 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1977).
63. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or.
1977), affd sub nom. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Munro, 626 F.2d 134
(9th Cir. 1980).
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ment programs, 4 a proposed subway system, 5 and an outer
continental shelf oil leasing program.66
II. STANDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PLAINTIFFS BEFORE LUJAN
In order to understand the Lujan decision and its implica-
tions for judicial review of agency compliance with NEPA's pro-
grammatic EIS requirement, it is helpful to review basic consti-
tutional and administrative law principles that affect the right
of individuals to challenge actions of the federal government.
These principles not only form the legal context in which Lujan
must be evaluated, but they also provide a necessary foundation
for evaluating the legitimacy of subsequent judicial interpreta-
tions of Lujan's somewhat cryptic pronouncements on standing.
A. Constitutional and Prudential Limitations on Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the scope
of judicial review in the federal courts to the resolution of "cas-
es" and "controversies."67 The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision to limit standing to plaintiffs who have suffered
an "injury in fact."' In order to establish an injury in fact, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: "[1] he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
conduct of the defendant ... [2] that the injury fairly can be
traced to the challenged action and [3] is likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision."
69
64. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Energy Research & Dev. Admin.,
451 F. Supp. 1245 (D.D.C. 1978), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d
1261 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
65. Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576 F.2d
573 (5th Cir. 1978).
66. California ex rel. Younger v. Morton, 404 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
67. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
68. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,
441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38,
41 (1976).
69. See cases cited supra note 68.
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In addition to these three constitutional standing require-
ments of injury, causation, and redressability, the Supreme
Court has also applied several "prudential principles"" in de-
termining whether a plaintiff has standing to sue.7 First, the
Court has denied standing to plaintiffs attempting to vindicate
the rights of third parties.72 Second, the Court has declined to
address "'abstract questions of wide public significance' which
amount to 'generalized grievances' pervasively shared and most
appropriately addressed in the representative branches.""'
Third, the Court has limited review to plaintiffs whose affected
interests fall within the "zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question."74
B. Standing and Reviewable Agency Action Under the
Administrative Procedure Act
Congress, however, may remove prudential barriers to stand-
ing by explicitly providing for judicial review.7 The broadest
right of review Congress granted appears in section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act,7 which states that "[a] person
70. Justice Scalia has questioned the source of the Court's authority to alter the
scope of congressionally granted standing through the imposition of "prudential" crite-
ria, and he has suggested that when courts apply the prudential factors, they are
really applying a set of presumptions to determine whether Congress intended to
create a judicially enforceable legal right. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Stand-
ing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881,
885-86 (1983). Professor Davis has criticized the concept of prudential limitations on
standing for plaintiffs who have suffered injury-in-fact. See 4 KENNETH C. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 24:5 (2d ed. 1983).
71. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75.
72. Id. at 474 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
73. Id. at 475 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500).
74. Id. at 475 (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970)). The "zone of interests" standard is also treated as an element of
standing under the APA. See infra nn. 79-84 and accompanying text.
75. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 ("Congress may grant an express right of action
to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules."); Camp, 397
U.S. at 154.
76. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Although both courts and commentators frequently
refer to the APA as granting the federal courts jurisdiction to review agency actions,
technically the APA only creates a cause of action for which there must be a sepa-
rate basis of jurisdiction. See CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 8.49 (Supp. 1992) (discussing Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)).
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suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."" This
provision addresses both standing (by limiting review to persons
suffering legal wrong or adversely affected within the meaning
of a statute) and the scope of reviewable action agency (by
limiting the subject of review to "agency action").'
The standing element of section 702 requires that a party
seeking judicial review of agency conduct have suffered some
"injury in fact" to an interest "'arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated' by the statutes that the
agencies were claimed to have violated."79 The injury in fact
analysis under section 702 is essentially identical to the analy-
sis under Article III of the Constitution," requiring injury,
causation and redressability.5 ' The "zone of interests" test adds
the requirement that, keeping in mind the general presumption
in favor of review of administrative action under the APA,"2
the plaintiffs adversely affected interests be among the type of
interests (but not necessarily the particular type of plaintiff)
77. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Justice Scalia suggests in Lujan that the "within the
meaning of a relevant statute" language of Section 702 applies both to plaintiffs who
are claiming they have been "adversely affected" and to plaintiffs claiming they have
been aggrieved by agency action. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,
883 (1990). Professor Davis, however, makes a compelling case based on the legisla-
tive history of the APA that the "within the meaning of a relevant statute" qualifica-
tion should be read to apply only to plaintiffs claiming they have been "aggrieved by
agency action," and that any person adversely affected in fact, without regard to the
objectives of any particular statutory provision, should be granted standing under
Section 702. See DAVIS, supra note 70, § 24:3.
78. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 882-83. The identification of "agency action" under
section 702 is not "strictly speaking ... a standing requirement because it does not
relate to the person bringing suit." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d
79, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Buckley, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982)).
79. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (quoting Camp, 397 U.S. at
153, and citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970)). Prior to the Supreme Court's
decisions in Camp and Barlow, plaintiffs claiming standing to sue under a statute
were required to demonstrate that the statute created a legal right in them that was
adversely affected. See e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306
U.S. 118 (1939).
80. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 667 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 311 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
81. Burford, 835 F.2d at 311.
82. Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984).
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that one can reasonably presume Congress intended to protect
when it passed the statute.' The Supreme Court has indicated
that the zone of interests standard should be applied liberally.
It should only preclude standing
[ilf the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it
cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to
permit the suit. The test is not meant to be especially de-
manding; in particular, there need be no indication of con-
gressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.'
Regarding section 702's limitation of judicial review to "agen-
cy action," the APA broadly defines agency action85 as "the
whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, re-
lief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act." 6 If
the agency action for which review is sought is not specifically
made reviewable by some statutory provision, then under sec-
tion 704 of the APA, it must be "final agency action.""7
Although many environmental statutes contain their own
citizen suit provisions," section 702 of the APA has provided a
basis for judicial review of certain environmentally significant
statutes-primarily NEPA and the various public land
83. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990), 497 U.S. at
883; Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 (1987).
84. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400 (emphasis added). Professor Davis has criticized
the zone of interests test as being without basis in section 702 and for failing to take
into account common law interests entitled to protection. See DAVIS supra note 70, §
24:17, at 275-76. Professor Davis has also suggested that the test has been inconsis-
tently applied and provides little predictive value for resolving standing issues. Id. at
276-80.
85. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1988) ("For the purpose of this chapter . 'agency
action' ha[s] the meaning[] given . . . by section 551 of this title.").
86. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
88. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2618(a) (1988);
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988); Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105(g)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)
(1988); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 3000j-8 (1988); Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1988); Clean Air Act
§ 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability Act of 1980 § 310, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988).
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management statutes89 which lack their own judicial review
provisions."
C. Injury in Fact and Reviewable Agency Action In
Environmental Litigation
The Supreme Court first addressed APA standing for environ-
mental plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Morton.9 In Morton, the
Sierra Club sought an injunction restraining the Forest Service
from. approving the construction of a ski resort in the Sequoia
National Forest.92 The Sierra Club asserted standing under
section 702 of the APA,93 based upon its "special interest in
the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national
parks, game refuges and forests of the country ... ."' The
plaintiffs alleged that construction of the proposed facility
89. See, e.g., the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 §§ 1-4, 16 U.S.C. §§
528-531 (1988); Wilderness Act of 1964 §§ 2-7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988); Nation-
al Forest Management Act of 1976 §§ 2-16, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988); Mining
and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 § 2, 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988); General Mining Laws of
1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1988); Taylor Grazing Act §§ 1-13, 43 U.S.C. § 315-315
(1988); Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 §§ 2-5, 6(a), 9, 11-12, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1908 (1988).
90. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1514 (9th
Cir. 1992) (recognizing APA right to review of agency compliance with the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA)); Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.
1979) (recognizing APA right to review of agency compliance with Federal Land Poli-
cy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act); Krueger
v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235, 238 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recognizing APA right to review of
agency compliance with the Mining and Mineral Policy Act of 1970); Sierra Club v.
Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356, 360-62 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (recognizing APA right to review of
agency compliance with NFMA); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 551-54
(W.D. Ark. 1991) (recognizing APA right to review of agency compliance with the
NFMA); Pathfinder Mines Corp. v. Clark, 620 F. Supp. 336, 338 (D. Ariz. 1985) (rec-
ognizing APA right to review of agency compliance with the General Mining Laws of
1872); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 868 (E.D.
Cal. 1985) (recognizing APA right to review of agency compliance with FLPMA, the
Taylor Grazing Act, and the Public Rangelands Improvement Act 1978); Sierra Club
v. Block, 615 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (D. Colo. 1985) (recognizing APA right to review of
agency compliance with the Wilderness Act of 1964).
91. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
92. Id. at 730. The plaintiffs alleged various statutory and regulatory violations.
See id. at 730 n.2.
93. See id. at 732-33.
94. Id. at 735 n.8 (quoting Sierra Club's Complaint 3).
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would cause injury in fact because of the adverse ecological and
aesthetic effects."
Significantly, the Supreme Court accepted that such aesthetic
and environmental injury could constitute "injury in fact" under
section 702 of the APA.9" Nonetheless, the Court held that the
Sierra Club lacked standing because it alleged only a "special
interest" in the conservation of public lands, rather than alleg-
ing that the Sierra Club itself or any member's use of the area
would be adversely affected by the construction of the proposed
resort.97 Such specific harm, the Court noted, was necessary to
render a party "adversely affected" or "aggrieved" within the
meaning of section 702.9'
The Supreme Court next discussed standing for environmen-
tal plaintiffs in United States v. Students Challenging Regulato-
ry Agency Procedures99 ("SCRAP F"). In SCRAP I, the Court
made it clear that although plaintiffs must demonstrate some
specific injury to establish standing, they need not be the only
parties suffering the injury. SCRAP I involved a challenge to
the Interstate Commerce Commission's decision to permit the
increase of freight rates.'00 The plaintiffs claimed that the rate
structure discouraged the use of recyclable materials and en-
couraged the use of new materials, thereby increasing the
amount of litter and further "adversely affecting the environ-
ment by encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and oth-
er extractive activities."'' The plaintiffs argued that they had
standing to sue because they used part of the adversely affected
95. Id. at 734.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 734-39.
98. Id. at 739. The Court noted that some lower federal courts had previously
suggested that an interest in consumer or environmental issues could be sufficient to
confer standing on an organization. See id. at 738-39 & n.14 (quoting Environmental
Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); Citizens Committee
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir. 1970); Scenic Hudson Pres-
ervation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965); Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728, 734-36 (E.D. Ark.
1971); Izaak Walton League of America v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. -1312, 1317 (D.
Minn. 1970).
99. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
100. Id. at 678.
101. Id. at 676.
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land in the Washington metropolitan area for recreational and
aesthetic purposes. °2
The Supreme Court found the plaintiffs' standing allegations
to be adequate under Morton, noting:
[Sitanding is not to be denied simply because many people
suffer the same injury .... To deny standing to persons
who are in fact injured simply because many others are
also injured, would mean that the most injurious and wide-
spread Government actions.could be questioned by nobody.
We cannot accept that conclusion.0 3
Accordingly, under Morton and SCRAP I, plaintiffs alleging
injury to their environmental interests must demonstrate that
they have suffered specific injury, but they need not demon-
strate that no other parties have been injured in a similar
manner."° The continued viability of this approach, however,
has been called into question by the Supreme Court's decision
in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation.0 5
102. Id. at 678.
103. Id. at 687-88.
104. The Court took a similarly relaxed approach with respect to the causation
and redressability elements of Article His injury in fact requirement in Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). In Duke Power, the plaintiffs
challenged the Price-Anderson Act (42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988)), which imposes a limit
on liability for accidents at nuclear power plants. Id. at 82-94. The plaintiffs argued
on the merits that the liability limitation violated the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution because it deprived them of due process and could lead to the taking of
their property without just compensation. Id. at 69.
The Court granted standing to the plaintiffs; however, its determination was
based on a different harm: the emission of radiation into the plaintiffs' environment
and the adverse impacts of two nuclear power plants on water quality. Id. at 73-74.
Although the plaintiffs failed to establish a direct link between the harm forming the
basis for their standing and their claim on the merits, the Court found that the p-
laintiffs satisfied Article II's standing requirements. The Court based its reasoning on
a "substantial likelihood" that the offending nuclear plants would not have been con-
structed without the liability limitation. "Our recent cases have required no more
than a showing that there is a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief requested will
redress the injury claimed . . . [thereby] satisfy[ing] the [causation] prong of the con-
stitutional standing requirement." Id. at 75 n.20 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropol-
itan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 (1977)).
105. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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III. LUJAN V. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
In Lujan, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia alleging that the Director of BLM and other federal
officials violated the Federal Land Policy Management Act of
1976 (FLPMA), NEPA and the APA through their mismanage-
ment of BLM's "land withdrawal review program.""6 The chal-
lenged program consisted of numerous actions taken by the
BLM which affected the availability of federal public lands for
private uses, including mining. 10 7
The federal defendants challenged NWF's standing' and
moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted the
government's motion, holding that NWF lacked standing be-
cause it failed to demonstrate "injury in fact" as required under
section 702 of the APA.0 9 NWF argued that it had standing
based on its organizational interests"0 in obtaining informa-
tion concerning the land withdrawal review program, partici-
pating in the federal decision-making process,"' and because
of the environmental harm suffered by its members."' The
district court rejected the claim of organizational harm, finding
NWF's declaration, a declaration submitted in support of NWF's
claim, "conclusory and completely devoid of specific facts.""'
The district court similarly found the two affidavits of NWF
members, submitted in support of the claim of environmental
harm, "vague, conclusory and lack[ing] [in the] factual
106. Id. at 875.
107. Id. at 877-79.
108. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988).
109. Id. at 329-32.
110. Id. at 329-32. Adverse impacts on an organization's activities may be suffi-
cient to support standing; however, general setbacks to an organization's social goals
are not sufficient. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982).
111. Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 330.
112. Id. at 330-32. An organization has standing to bring an action on behalf of its
members if "(a) [one or more of the organization's] members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests [that the organization] seeks to
protect are germane to the organization's purposes; and (c) neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the law-
suit." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
113. Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 330.
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specificity" needed to establish "injury in fact" under section
702 of the APA and Article III of the Constitution. 114 The
court stressed that the affiants alleged only that they used land
"in the vicinity" of the land affected by the Land Withdrawal
Review Program rather than the affected land itself."' More-
over, the allegations of environmental harm, resulting from
decisions affecting two specific areas, did not provide "any basis
for standing to challenge, as violative of the Federal Land Poli-
cy Management Act, the legality of each of the 1250 or so indi-
vidual classification terminations and withdrawal
revocations.""'
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit reversed."' The court of appeals found that the
allegation that the affiant used land in the vicinity of the land
affected by the Interior Department's decisions could only refer
to the lands within the affected area itself; otherwise, "her al-
legation of impairment to her use and enjoyment would be
meaningless, or peijurious.""' The court of appeals further
noted that the affidavit was, at worst, merely ambiguous as to
whether the lands the affiant used were among the lands af-
fected. Consequently, the court of appeals held the district court
was obligated, on a motion for summary judgment, to resolve
that ambiguity in favor of the non-moving party."' Moreover,
the court of appeals found that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to consider four supplemental declara-
tions on standing which NWF had submitted after the district
court requested supplemental memoranda on the standing issue."
114. Id. at 331-32.
115. Id. at 331-32.
116. Id. at 332. The district court had previously granted NWF's motion for a
preliminary injunction against any changes in the classifications of the public lands
at issue. National Wildlife Fed'n. v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), recon-
sideration denied, 676 F. Supp. 280 (1986. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rehg denied, 844
F.2d 889, 890 (1988).
117. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
118. Id. at 431.
119. Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 433. The court of appeals noted that "[n]o party to this litigation seri-
ously disputes that NWF's supplemental affidavits, if considered, easily satisfy the
level of specificity needed for standing under any of the Supreme Court's articulated
tests." Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari12' and reversed in a
five-to-four decision.122 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
rejected the two affidavits originally submitted by NWF in
support of its claim of standing. Scalia embraced the district
court's conclusion that the allegations of harm to the affiants'
use and enjoyment of land "in the vicinity" of the lands
adversely affected were insufficient to establish injury in fact
under section 702 of the APA.'23
121. 493 U.S. 1042 (1990).
122. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 874 (1990).
123. Id. at 885-89. This aspect of the Lujan opinion has been the subject of exten-
sive commentary. See, e.g., Bradley J. Larsen, Meeting the Requirements of Standing:
A Framework for Environmental Interest Groups: Lujan v. National Wildlife Feder-
ation, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 277 (1990); James M. Duncan, Note, Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation: Standing and the Two-Million Acre Question, 23 PAC. L. J. 223
(1991); Bill J. Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law: Judicial Policy and
the Impact of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 997 (1991);
Tae P. Ho, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation: Non-User Plaintiffs and the
Standing Requirement of Injury in Fact in Environmental Litigation, 5 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 99 (1990); Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 863; Robichaud, supra note 5, at 443
(1991); Sears, supra note 5, at 293 (1991); Sheldon, supra note 5, at 10,577; Michael
J. Shinn, Note, Misusing Procedural Devices to Dismiss an Environmental
Lawsuit-Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 66 WAsH. L. REV. 893 (1991); Kath-
erine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs:
Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV.
187 (1991); Stu Stuller, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 933 (1991); John Treangen, Note, Standing: Closing the Doors of Judicial Re-
view, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 36 S.D. L. REV. 136 (1991).
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its restrictive reading of the specificity of allega-
tions required on a motion for summary judgment to satisfy APA section 702's "injury
in fact" requirement for environmental plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112
S. Ct. 2130 (1992). In Defenders of Wildlife, several environmental organizations chal-
lenged a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that excluded feder-
ally funded actions in foreign countries from the consultation requirement of section
7(a) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA). Id. at 2135. The United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed the action, holding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 658 F. Supp. 43, 47-48 (D.
Minn. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Defenders of
Wildlife, Friends of Animals & Their Env't v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1988).
On remand, the district court held for the plaintiffs and the court of appeals
affirmed. Defenders of Wildlife, Friends of Animals & Their Env't v. Lujan, 911 F.2d
117 (8th 1990) affg Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 707 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Minn.
1989).
The Supreme Court reversed. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992). The Court held that while the desire to observe an animal species was a cog-
nizable basis for standing, affidavits submitted by members of the plaintiff organiza-
tions were insufficient to establish "imminent" injury. Id. at 2138. These affidavits
stated that the members had visited and intended to revisit in the future, regions of
foreign countries where endangered species were threatened by actions of United
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The Court next rejected the Eighth Circuit's alternative hold-
ing that the four supplemental affidavits submitted by NWF
were sufficient to establish its right to review." The Court
focused not on the specificity of the affiants allegations of harm,
but rather on the scope of the challenged activities.'25 The
Court concluded that the land withdrawal review program was
not subject to judicial review:
[It was not an] "agency action" within the meaning of §
702, much less a "final agency action" within the meaning
of § 704 .... [Instead] [iUt is simply the name by which
[the BLM] ha[s] occasionally referred to the continuing (and
thus constantly changing) operations of the BLM in review-
ing withdrawal revocation applications of public lands and
developing land use plans .... As the District Court ex-
plained, the "land withdrawal review program" extends
to ... "1250 or so individual classification terminations and
withdrawal revocations."'26
The Court acknowledged that some of the individual actions
identified in the affidavits which affected the status of particu-
lar areas of public lands might constitute reviewable "agency
action."2 Nonetheless, the Court suggested that even those
actions would not be ripe for review until the actual physical
disturbance of the land became imminent. 2 1
Finally, the Court rejected NWF's assertion that it had stand-
ing in its own right because of harm to its organizational inter-
ests in receiving and disseminating information and in partici-
States agencies. Id. The Court concluded that "[sluch 'some day' intentions-without
any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our
cases require." Id.
In dicta, Justice Scalia also suggested that the plaintiffs were seeking imper-
missible "programmatic" review because they challenged the regulation rather than
the individual, federally-funded projects overseas. Id. at 2140. The ability of persons
to obtain review of agency regulations which adversely affect them, however, is not
seriously in question. See infra nn. 151-52 and accompanying text.
124. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-94. The Court also held that the district court had not
abused its discretion by refusing to consider the four supplemental affidavits. Id. at
894-98.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 890 (quoting Burford, 699 F. Supp. at 332).
127. Id. at 892.
128. Id. at 892-93 & n.3.
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pating in the decisionmaking processes regarding federal
lands.129 As with the affidavits alleging environmental harm
to NWF members, the Court found an affidavit submitted in
support of NWF's claim of organizational standing to be defi-
cient because it failed to identify an agency action or final
agency action subject to review under sections 702 and 704.13
129. Id. at 898-99. The Lujan Court accepted without deciding that organizations
may establish standing on the basis of their interest in receiving and disseminating
information and using such information to participate in agency decisionmaking. Id.
at 899. A long line of cases had previously endorsed the concept of "informational
standing." See, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
448-50 (1989); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1087 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Foundation on Economic Trends
v. Lyng, 680 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D.D.C. 1988); National Org. for the Reform of Marijua-
na Laws (NORML) v. Department of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D.D.C. 1978);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Callaway, 431 F. Supp. 722, 729-30 (D.D.C.
1977), affd in part sub nom. Isaac Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir.
1981); see also Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
901 F.2d 107, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Public Citizen v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 869 F.2d
1541, 1546 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Arguably, all NEPA plaintiffs are "informational standing" plaintiffs in the
sense that NEPA does not require any substantive relief from environmental harm.
NEPA merely requires that information about environmental harm be made available
to the public and the federal decisionmakers. Nonetheless, in recent years some
courts have either questioned the legitimacy of informational standing, see Foundation
on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Public Citizen v.
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 782 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (D.D.C.
1992); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 398-99 (D.D.C.
1992), or suggested that informational standing is only available to plaintiffs who can
demonstrate that they may suffer actual environmental harm from the deprivation of
relevant environmental information. See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("the procedural and infor-
mational thrust of NEPA gives rise to cognizable injury from denial of its explanatory
process, so long as there is a reasonable risk that environmental injury may occur");
Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 367 (D. Colo. 1992)); Lawrence
Gerschwer, Note, Informational Standing Under NEPA. Justiciability and the Environ-
mental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 996 (1993).
The limitation of informational standing to plaintiffs who can demonstrate that
they are subject to actual environmental harm would essentially eliminate informa-
tional standing since such plaintiffs could establish standing based on threatened
environmental harm alone. At least one recent case, however, suggested that informa-
tional standing under NEPA remains viable even for plaintiffs who are not threat-
ened by specific environmental harm. See Public Citizen v. Office of the United States
Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 29 n.12 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd on other grounds,
5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
130. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 898-99.
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IV. LUJAN AND PROGRAMMATIC EISs
The Lujan decision has been interpreted by courts'' and
commentators 132 in a manner that raises three closely related
problems for litigants attempting to obtain judicial review of
agency compliance with the programmatic EIS requirement.
First, and most significantly, 13 Lujan has been read to hold
that an agency's decision not to prepare a programmatic EIS is
unreviewable because programs are too broad in scope to consti-
tute reviewable agency action under section 702 of the APA."4
Second, even if it is accepted that an agency's decision not to
prepare a programmatic EIS constitutes reviewable agency
action, Lujan has been interpreted to hold that an agency's
compliance with NEPA is not "final" for the purposes of section
704 until some specific commitment of resources has been
made.'35 Third, Lujan has been interpreted as holding that
section 702 of the APA requires environmental plaintiffs to
demonstrate that they use specific areas of land affected by
government action. This requirement makes it difficult for envi-
ronmental plaintiffs to establish standing to challenge the
government's failure to prepare programmatic EISs affecting
vast areas.'36
As discussed below, however, each of these arguments is
based on a fundamental misconception about the nature of the
agency action which is subject to review under NEPA. Once the
nature of the agency action subject to APA review under NEPA
is understood, the issues of scope of reviewable action, timing of
review and geographical nexus should not serve to preclude
agency compliance with the programmatic EIS requirement.
131. See cases cited supra note 6.
132. See sources cited supra note 5.
133. As discussed infra in sections IV B and IV C, the confusion over the nature
of the agency action subject to review under NEPA is arguably the source of both the
finality and geographical nexus problems for NEPA plaintiffs.
134. See Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
135. See Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (D. Mont. 1991)
(citing Lujan in holding that a forest management plan and its accompanying EIS
was not ripe for review until some "concrete action implementing the plan is about to
be taken . . . ).
136. See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395
(D.D.C. 1992); Greenpeace U.S. v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 756 (D. Haw. 1990).
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A. Programmatic EISs and Agency Action
As already noted,"7 the APA defines reviewable agency ac-
tion broadly to include "the whole or part of an agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial there-
of, or failure to act."'38 Accordingly, prior to the Supreme
Court's discussion of the issue in Lujan,'39 the "agency action"
requirement of section 702 of the APA had not constituted a
significant barrier to judicial review of environmentally signifi-
cant agency actions. 40
In Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng,'' however, a
panel12 of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit cited Lujan in support of its holding that
plaintiffs challenging the Department of Agriculture's refusal to
prepare an EIS on its "germplasm protection program" lacked
standing because they failed to identify an "agency action" sub-
ject to review under the APA.' The court of appeals conclud-
ed that the Supreme Court in Lujan had implicitly held that an
agency's refusal to prepare an EIS did not constitute "agency
action" within the meaning of section 702 of the APA; instead,
the agency action which must be identified in the context of
NEPA is the "major federal action" subject to the EIS re-
quirement.4 The "germplasm protection program" challenged
by the plaintiffs, the court stated, did not constitute identifiable
"agency action" any more than the "Land Withdrawal Review
Program" at issue in Lujan.'
137. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988).
139. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 408-09 (1976).
141. 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
142. Judge Randolph wrote for the court of appeals. Judge Buckley dissented in
part but concurred in the judgment. Id. at 80.
143. Id. at 85-87.
144. Id. at 85.
145. Id. at 86. Arguably the court of appeals decision in Lyng is limited by its
terms to plaintiffs claiming "informational standing" rather than injury in fact to
their use and enjoyment of land. See id. at 87. Whatever quantum of logic underlies
the court of appeals' discussion of agency action in Lyng, however, would seem
equally applicable to either "informational harm" or "use and enjoyment" plaintiffs.
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This interpretation of Lujan as implicitly equating "agency
action" under section 702 of the APA with "major federal ac-
tion" under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, however, finds little
support in the Lujan opinion itself. Justice Scalia did not direct'
his discussion of agency action at NEPA, but instead at "pro-
grammatic" review of the BLM's compliance with its substan-
tive obligations under the FLPMA. At no point in his agency
action discussion did Justice Scalia address the programmatic
EIS issue or discuss the criteria for determining whether an
agency's actions are subject to NEPA's programmatic EIS re-
quirement.'48 In addition, the parties only made one brief ref-
erence to the programmatic EIS requirement in the memoranda
they submitted to the Supreme Court.'47 The litigation was fo-
cused from the beginning on the FLPMA: seven of the eight
counts in NWF's complaint were based on the FLPMA and only
one was based on NEPA.148
Moreover, Justice Scalia explicitly acknowledged in the Lujan
opinion that
[if there were] some specific order or regulation, applying
some particular measure across the board to all individual
classification terminations and withdrawal revocations ...
it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person
adversely affected-and the entire "land withdrawal review
program," insofar as the content of that particular action is
concerned, would thereby be affected."
A decision not to prepare a programmatic EIS where one was
required would be exactly the type of challengeable agency
action described by Scalia, since it could affect the entire pro-
gram subject to the EIS requirement. 50 Consequently, Justice
Scalia's assertion in Lujan that the land withdrawal review
146. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-94.
147. See Brief in Opposition for Respondent at 5, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n,
497 U.S. 871 (1990) (No. 89-640).
148. Amended Complaint of NWF (filed Aug. 19, 1985).
149. 497 U.S. at 890-91 n.2.
150. See id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that reviewable "agency ac-
tion" sometimes includes rules of broad applicability, and that plaintiffs may seek
"programmatic" review of such actions in the sense that "if the plaintiff prevails, the
result is that the rule is invalidated, not simply that the court forbids its application
to a particular individual.").
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program challenged by NWF was "not an 'agency action' within
the meaning of [section] 702, much less a 'final agency action'
within the meaning of [section] 704"' should be read to ap-
ply only to NWF's attempt to seek programmatic review under
the FLPMA.
The Lyng court's erroneous reading of Lujan is largely attrib-
utable to Justice Scalia's failure in his programmatic review
discussion to distinguish between review under the APA of an
agency's compliance with NEPA and compliance with its organic
statutes.152 The FLPMA, the organic statute at issue in Lujan,
imposes various substantive obligations on the BLM involving
the management of public lands.153 Similarly, most other stat-
utes for which the APA is asserted as a basis of review impose
substantive obligations on the agency."' Thus when a plaintiff
seeks review of agency compliance with such statutes under the
APA, they are asking the court to examine the actual substan-
tive decisions made and actions taken by the agency.'55
NEPA, by contrast, imposes only the procedural requirement
that agencies consider environmental factors through the prepa-
ration of an EIS before taking major actions.'56 Thus the "ag-
ency action" at issue under NEPA is the agency's compliance
with the EIS requirement, not the substantive action itself
which is the subject of the EIS. The Supreme Court recently
acknowledged this distinction between review under NEPA and
151. Id. at 890.
152. See id. at 890-94.
153. Obligations imposed on the BLM under the FLPMA include keeping an inven-
tory of public lands and making determinations regarding the availability of public
lands for commercial uses such as mining. See id. at 877.
154. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1988) (requiring Secretary of Agriculture to
administer the national forests for multiple use and sustained yield); 16 U.S.C. §
1131-1136 (1988) id. §§ 1131-1136 (requiring agencies with jurisdiction over wilder-
ness areas to maintain them in a manner consistent with their wilderness character);
16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1988) (providing guidelines for the management of the na-
tional forests); 30 U.S.C. § 21a (1988) (requiring Secretary of the Interior to carry out
policy of developing mineral resources); 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (providing for public access
to hardrock mineral resources on federal lands); 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-3151 (1988) (estab-
lishing system for private livestock grazing on public rangelands); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1782 (1988) (governing BLM procedures for making public lands available for private
ownership or use); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1988) (providing additional guidelines for
managing public rangelands).
155. See cases cited supra, note 90.
156. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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review under statutes which impose substantive obligations in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.'57 In Defenders of Wildlife, with
Scalia again writing for the Court, the Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Interior which required other agencies to
confer with him under section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act' s8 only with regard to federally funded projects in the
United States or on the high seas. 5 ' However, the Court ob-
served in dicta:
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural
rights" are special: The person who has been accorded a
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert
that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case-law, one
living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a
federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licens-
ing agency's failure to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement, even though he cannot establish with any cer-
tainty that the [EIS] will cause the license to be withheld
or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed
for many years.16 "
Through its discussion of the "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard of review under NEPA, the Supreme Court has also indi-
cated that the issuance of an EIS or a decision not to prepare
an EIS is the "agency action" subject to review.''
157. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
159. 112 S. Ct. at 2134.
160. Id. at 2142-43 n.7. See also Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
161. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-78 (1989)
(discussing "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review for decision not to prepare a
supplemental EIS); see also City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 499-500 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840
F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1988); Park County Resource Council v. United States Dep't
of Agric., 817 F.2d 609, 621 (10th Cir. 1987); Louisiana v. Lee, 758 F.2d 1081, 1083
(5th Cir. 1985); River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the Army, 764 F.2d 445,
449 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1055 (1986); Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Town of Orangetown v.
Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1983); Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 159 (4th
Cir. 1983); Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 687
F.2d 732, 742 (3d Cir. 1982); Boles v. Onton Dock, Inc., 659 F.2d 74, 75-76 (6th Cir.
1981); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1980).
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In addition to its failure to consider that the EIS require-
ment constitutes a separate procedural obligation in addition to
the underlying "major federal action," the Lyng court's analysis
is seriously flawed for two other reasons. First, the equation of
"agency action" under section 702 of the APA with "major feder-
al action" under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA is inconsistent with
the plain language of NEPA. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA treats
"proposals for legislation" as "major federal action" subject to
the EIS requirement,'62 yet clearly agency legislative proposals
in and of themselves are not "agency action" subject to review
under the APA. Second, as noted by Judge Buckley in his opin-
ion dissenting in part and concurring in the Lyng majority's
judgment, in order to ensure that the environmental impacts of
a proposed major federal action are adequately considered, an
EIS must be prepared before a major federal action has been
finally approved. 6 ' Under the Lyng majority's analysis, judi-
cial review would be inappropriate until the agency had actual-
ly begun the major federal action, which "would effectively
eliminate judicial oversight of NEPA's procedural require-
ments."'64 Consequently, the Lyng court's equation of the
"agency action" required for review under the APA with the
"major federal action" which triggers NEPA's EIS requirement
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988) (requiring preparation of EISs "on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment . . .).
163. Lyng, 943 F.2d at 89 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478,
492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
349 (1989)); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371
(1989).
164. Lyng, 943 F.2d at 87 (Buckley, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the
judgment). Judge Buckley would have found the USDA's decision not to prepare an
EIS, contained in a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI), to be reviewable agen-
cy action. Id. at 88. Buckley, however, would have held against the plaintiffs on the
merits. Id. at 89-90.
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should be rejected in favor of the traditional view 65 of the
EIS decision itself as the reviewable agency action.'66
B. Programmatic EISs and Final Agency Action Under APA
Section 704
Given the confusion over the nature of the agency action
subject to review under NEPA, it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed-
eration'. that review of the BLM's land classification actions
would not be appropriate until some physical disturbance of the
165. Several courts in cases decided since Lujan have embraced the traditional
view of the EIS decision as the agency action subject to review under § 702 of the
APA. In Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991), for example,
the district court rejected the argument that under Lujan a forest management plan
and its accompanying EIS were too general in scope to constitute reviewable "agency
action" under § 702 of the APA. Id. at 553-54. The court noted that the activities at
issue in Lujan had only been defined as a coherent program by the plaintiffs, where-
as an integrated forest management plan was mandated under the National Forest
Management Act. Id. at 554 & n.10 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988)); see also Colora-
do Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364, 369 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding Secretary
of the Interior's decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS on his removal of five
wilderness study areas from wilderness recommendation to be a particular agency
action which caused the plaintiffs harm); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F.
Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992), affd 998 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding a BLM decision
not to prepare a supplemental EIS on a timber sales program to be reviewable agen-
cy action).
166. Arguably even Lyng can be read to permit review of a decision not to prepare
an EIS so long as the plaintiff can point to a specific "major federal action" within
the meaning of NEPA-regardless of whether the particular major federal action is a
site-specific project or a programmatic action. If this interpretation is correct, the
Lyng decision was based only on the court of appeals' conclusion that no germplasm
preservation program existed which constituted major federal action requiring
preparation of an EIS. See Lyng, 943 F.2d at 86-87. Thus Lyng may not increase the
burden on NEPA plaintiffs; it may only shift the identification of major federal action
from the merits to a threshold inquiry necessary to establish jurisdiction. See id. at
85 ("We recognize that this tends to merge standing under the APA with the merits
of a plaintiff's NEPA claim."). As the Lyng court noted, such an approach is not with-
out precedent. The Data Processing approach to standing requires the identification of
"injury in fact," which traditionally would be considered an aspect of the merits of
the action. See id. at 86 (citing STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 1094 (2d ed. 1985)); see also Barlow v. Col-
lins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Data Process-
ing's zones of interest standard "confus[es] the merits with the plaintiffs' standing to
challenge [agency] action.").
167. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
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land was imminent 6 ' has similarly been misconstrued to limit
judicial review of agency compliance with NEPA's programmatic
EIS requirement.'69 In Resources Ltd. v. Robertson,70 for ex-
ample, several environmental organizations challenged the ade-
quacy of a forest management plan and its accompanying EIS.
These organizations alleged that the plan and the EIS failed to
properly consider alternatives and failed to adequately address
fisheries, endangered species, and water quality. 7' The United
States District Court for the District of Montana cited Lujan in
holding that the forest management plan and its accompanying
EIS would not be ripe for review until some "concrete action
implementing the plan is about to be taken .... .""'
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Resources Ltd. court
failed to address either the standard for making finality deter-
minations or the issuance of the allegedly flawed EIS as the
agency action subject to review. An agency action is usually
considered final under section 704 if "the agency has completed
its decisionmaking process, and .. .the result of the process is
one that will directly affect the parties."' Under NEPA, once
168. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891-93 & n.3.
169. Some controversy surrounds whether the Court's discussion of agency action
and finality in Lujan was holding or dicta. Justice Blackmun indicates in his Lujan
dissent that it was dicta. See id. at 913 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This interpreta-
tion has been embraced by some commentators. See, e.g., Shinn, supra note 123, at
903; Steller, supra note 123, at 950-52, 956. Several other commentators, however,
have treated the agency action and finality discussion as holding. See E. Gates
Garrity-Rokous, supra note 11, at 645, 654-55. Macfarlane, supra note 5, at 921.
Sheldon, supra note 5, at 10,562; Sears, supra note 5, at 333-34.
The latter view is more persuasive, since the Lujan majority's conclusion that
the land withdrawal review program was not agency action or final agency action
under §§ 702 and 704 was one of the two bases for rejecting the four supplemental
environmental harm affidavits. Further, it was the only basis for rejecting NWF's
claim of organization standing based upon the other affidavit. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at
892-94. Therefore while the programmatic discussion might be considered dicta as to
the scope of review, it must be holding insofar as it was necessary to find no agency
action and no final agency action in order to reject the five affidavits.
170. 789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991).
171. Id. at 1531-32.
172. Id. at 1534.
173. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992). The Supreme Court
first articulated the modern approach to issues of finality and ripeness in 1967 in the
Abbott Laboratories trilogy: Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
("Abbott Laboratories") and its two companion cases, Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 158 (1967) ("Toilet Goods 1"), and Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S.
167 (1967) ("Toilet Goods IF). In Abbott Laboratories, the Supreme Court held that
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an agency has either issued a final EIS or made a final deci-
sion not to prepare an EIS, the agency has completed the de-
cisionmaking process with regard to NEPA compliance.74
Moreover, the decision is "final" under section 704 of the APA
as soon as that decision is made, because the harm which oc-
curs from noncompliance with NEPA is the increased risk of
environmental harm that results from making decisions on
major federal actions without adequately considering the envi-
ronmental consequences. 75 If an agency fails to adequately
comply with section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, that increased risk of
flawed decisionmaking resulting in environmental harm occurs
as soon as the agency determines that no further consideration
of potential environmental impacts is required.76
regulations of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requiring prescription drug
manufacturers to include the generic name of the drug next to the trade name in
printed material were ripe for review because, inter alia, withholding review would
have "direct and immediate impact" on the plaintiff manufacturers. Abbott Lab., 387
U.S. at 152. The Court held another set of regulations permitting the FDA to inspect
cosmetic manufacturers' facilities, processes, and formulae to be not ripe for review in
Toilet Goods L The Court noted that "no irremediable adverse consequences flow from
requiring a later challenge to this regulation by a manufacturer who refuses to allow
this type of inspection." Toilet Goods I, 387 U.S. at 164-65. A third set of FDA regu-
lations that expanded the number of substances subject to regulation as color addi-
tives and were "self-executing and ha[d] an immediate and substantial impact upon
the [plaintiffs]" were found ripe in Toilet Goods 11, 387 U.S. at 171.
In the Abbott Laboratories trilogy, the Supreme Court treated finality under §
704 as limited to the issue of whether the agency's decisionmaking process was com-
plete. See Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 151; Toilet Goods 1, 387 U.S. at 162-63.
The ripeness inquiry addressed not only the completeness of the decisionmaking pro-
cess, but also other factors affecting the appropriateness of judicial review such as
whether a purely legal issue was involved and whether the agency's action would
have an immediate adverse impact on the plaintiff. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at
150-54; Toilet Goods I, 387 U.S. at 162-64; Toilet Goods II, 387 U.S. at 168-69. The
Supreme Court, however, has apparently ceased to distinguish between ripeness and
finality and incorporates the issue of whether the agency action directly impacts the
plaintiff into its finality analysis. See, e.g., Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2773. The Court
has thus converted finality from being merely an aspect of ripeness or of a cause of
action under the APA to a standing issue because resolving questions of finality now
requires examining the status of the plaintiff. See id. at 2776. Professor Davis has
suggested, however, that there is no need to distinguish between the doctrines of
ripeness and finality. See 4 KENNETH C. DAViS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 26.10, at 458
(2d ed. 1983).
174. See Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP 11), 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975).
175. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
176. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUbi. L. REV. 1432, 1465 (1988) (noting that in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Supreme Court found that the "increased risk" that
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As the Supreme Court noted in Aberdeen & Rockfish Rail-
road Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP II) :177
NEPA ... create[s] a discreet procedural obligation on
government agencies to give written consideration of envi-
ronmental issues in connection with certain major federal
actions and a right of action in adversely affected parties to
enforce that obligation. When agency or departmental con-
sideration of environmental factors in connection with that
"federal action" is complete, notions of finality ... do not
stand in the way of judicial review of the adequacy of such
consideration, even though other aspects of the ... [major
federal action] are not ripe for review.17 1
Accordingly, in Kieppe v. Sierra Club,' 9 the Supreme Court
held on the merits that there was no proposal for a regional
coal development program subject to NEPA's EIS requirement,
implicitly finding that the decision not to prepare an EIS con-
stituted reviewable final agency action.' The Kleppe Court
noted that judicial review is appropriate as soon as a proposal
for major federal action is made and "someone protests either
the absence or the adequacy of the final [environmental] impact
statement. This is the point at which an agency's action has
reached sufficient maturity to assure that judicial intervention
will not hazard unnecessary disruption."'8 The lower federal
courts have similarly indicated that an agency's final disposi-
tion of its obligations under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA is "final
agency action" reviewable under section 704 of the APA.'5 '
the plaintiff would not be admitted to a medical school because of an affirmative
action program was sufficient injury for standing purposes).
177. 422 U.S. 289 (1975).
178. Id. at 319-20.
179. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
180. Id. at 403-06. The Supreme Court's decision on the merits in Kleppe involved
an issue which is sometimes confused with the § 704 finality: whether an agency's
contemplation of some potential action has become sufficiently concrete to constitute
an actual proposal for major federal action within the meaning of § 102(2)(C) of
NEPA. See id. This issue, however, unlike the finality inquiry, goes to the merits of
whether the plaintiff has identified the major federal action or proposal for major
federal action necessary to trigger § 102(2)(C)'s EIS requirement.
181. Id. at 406 n.15.
182. See, e.g., Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 492 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding "the controversy is ripe because the agency's action in issuing the EIS
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Although Justice Scalia's discussion of programmatic review
in the Lujan v. National Wildlife Federationi"a decision has
created some confusion as to the nature of the final agency
action which a NEPA plaintiff must identify,' the Lujan de-
cision did not purport to overrule either SCRAP H or Kleppe on
the ripeness issue.1" Moreover, Lujan can be harmonized with
SCRAP 11 and Kleppe if Scalia's final agency action discussion
is read to apply only to programmatic review of the BLM's
compliance with its substantive obligations under the FLPMA.
As already noted, the Court in Lujan was primarily concerned
with APA review of the BLM's compliance with the FLPMA,
not NEPA. The denial of review of the BLM's compliance with
the FLPMA was appropriate, since the FLPMA imposes sub-
stantive mandates on the BLM."' Consequently, any actions
taken under the FLPMA would only be "final" when the harm
intended to be prevented under the FLPMA-actual environ-
mental harm-was about to occur. Under NEPA, in contrast, an
agency action is final under section 704 as soon as the agency
is clear and final"); Friedman Bros. Inv. Co. v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir.
1982) (holding that the decision not to prepare an EIS is -final' in that it is the
culmination of the agency's administrative procedures and will not be reconsidered at
any later date"); Izaak Walton League v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("a concluding environmental impact statement is a 'final agency action' within the
meaning of the APA-"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Scientists' Inst. for Pub.
Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The
instant case is ripe . . . since the issue tendered for review is whether an impact
statement itself... is presently required under NEPA. That the statement would
consider the future effects of the [proposed] program does not detract form the ripe-
ness of this legal issue."); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3 1993 (judicial review of agency
NEPA compliance is appropriate as soon as agency has issued a final EIS, a final
finding of no significant impact, or taken action which will have result in irreparable
injury).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has indicated that a final EIS may
in certain narrow circumstances be found unripe for review if the underlying major
federal action is "undergoing further study [and] may ultimately be abandoned or
substantially altered ... ." See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 677 F.2d 259,
263 (2d Cir. 1982). In Goldschmidt, however, the court of appeals suggested that sup-
plemental EISs would be required if a determination was made to proceed with the
two proposed sections of interstate highway at issue. Id. at 264. Thus, although nomi-
nally final EISs had already been issued on the highway segments, Goldschmidt can
best be read as turning on the lack of a truly "final" disposition by the agency of its
responsibilities under section 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
183. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
184. See Resources Ltd., v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991).
185. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-94.
186. Id.
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has either issued a final EIS or made a proposal for major
federal action without preparing an EIS, because that is the
point at which the procedural harm NEPA compliance is in-
tended to prevent occurs.
187
Several federal court opinions decided after Lujan have re-
flected this distinction between final agency action under NEPA
and other substantive statutes. In Colorado Environmental
Coalition v. Lujan,5 5 for example, the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado held that the Secretary of the
Interior's decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS"5 9 on his
removal of five wilderness study areas from wilderness recom-
mendation was a final agency action subject to review under
section 704 of the APA."9 ' The court rejected the argument
that under Lujan the plaintiffs had failed to identify any final
agency action, noting that unlike Lujan, the plaintiffs' affidavits
established that they were suffering "direct and immediate"
effects from the decision. 9' Moreover, because of the procedur-
al nature of NEPA, the harm to the decisionmaking process oc-
curred as soon as the Secretary made his decision to remove
five wilderness study areas from wilderness recommendation
without preparing a supplemental EIS."5 2
187. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit's recent decision in Public Citizen v. United States Trade
Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994), is not
inconsistent with this analysis. In Public Citizen the court of appeals held that the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") negotiated by the Office of the
United States Trade Representative ("OTR) was not "final agency action" subject to
NEPA's EIS requirement because it would not become a final proposal until it was
submitted to Congress for approval. Id. at 551-52. Moreover, because under the Trade
Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1)(B) (1988), NAFTA would be submitted to Congress
by the President, and not the OTR, although it would be "final" when submitted, it
would no longer be "agency action" since the President is not an agency subject to ju-
dicial review under the APA. Id. The court of appeals noted that this limitation on
judicial review under section 704 of the APA applied only in those rare instances in
which "the President has final constitutional or statutory responsibility for the final
step necessary for the agency action directly to affect the parties." Id. at 552.
188. 803 F. Supp. 364 (D. Colo. 1992).
189. Agencies must prepare a supplemental EIS if either "(i) [t]he agency makes
substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental con-
cerns; or (ii) [tihere are significant new circumstances or information relevant to envi-
ronmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts." 40 C.F.R. §
1502.9(c)(1) (1993).
190. 803 F. Supp. at 370.
191. Id. at 369.
192. Id. at 369-70.
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Similarly, in Portland Audubon Society v. Lujan,93  the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon found
that Lujan did not preclude it from holding that a BLM deci-
sion not to prepare a supplemental EIS on a timber sales pro-
gram was reviewable final agency action.' In Sierra Club v.
Robertson,"5 the United States District Court for the Western
District of Minnesota rejected the argument that under Lujan a
forest management plan and its accompanying EIS were not
final agency action subject to judicial review.' These cases
indicate that the courts in future NEPA actions may continue
to apply the traditional finality and ripeness analysis of SCRAP
11 and Kleppe rather than construing Lujan to have radically
altered the final agency action analysis under NEPA.
C. Programmatic EISs and The "Geographical Nexus"
Requirement
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lujan, a line of
cases had indicated that in order to satisfy the "injury in fact"
requirement of Article III and section 702 of the APA, 97 there
must be a "geographical nexus" between the area used and
enjoyed by an environmental plaintiff and the area where the
adverse impacts of the challenged government action are occur-
ring or will occur.' Because it merely constitutes the axiom-
atic requirement that a plaintiff basing his claim of standing
upon his use and enjoyment of a certain area of land demon-
strate that he actually uses and enjoys that land, the geograph-
ical nexus standard has not imposed any great burden on envi-
193. 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992).
194. Id. at 1505.
195. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
196. Id. at 554-55.
197. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 932 (9th
Cir. 1988); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 491 (9th
Cir. 1987); City of Evanston v. Regional Transp. Auth., 825 F.2d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir.
1987); South East Lake View Neighbors v. Department of Housing and Urban Dev.,
685 F.2d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1982); California ex rel. Younger v. Andrus, 608 F.2d
1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 18.2 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 800,
805 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Conservation Law Found. of R.I. v. General Servs. Admin., 427
F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74 (D.R.I. 1977); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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ronmental plaintiffs alleging injury to their use and enjoyment
of land.'99
The Court's conclusion in Lujan that the allegations in the
NWF's members' affidavits of use and enjoyment of lands "in
the vicinity" of the lands adversely affected were insufficiently
specific,.. however, has been interpreted in several recent de-
cisions 2°1 as imposing a more stringent geographical nexus
standard which could cause problems for programmatic EIS
plaintiffs. One court suggested, without explication, that Lujan
imposed "more restrictive requirements" than the traditional
geographical nexus standard.2 2 It has been suggested in an-
other recent decision either that an individual whose use of a
certain area of land is adversely affected by an agency's failure
to prepare an EIS (or the preparation of an inadequate EIS)
does not have standing to challenge that failure if the EIS
would address a much larger area than that actually used by
199. See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Oregon Natural Resources, 817 F.2d at 489; City of
Evanston, 825 F.2d at 1126; South East Lake View Neighbors, 685 F.2d at 1039;
Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 5 F.3d 549 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994); Conser-
vation Law Found. of R.I. v. General Servs. Admin., 427 F. Supp. 1369, 1373-74
(D.R.I. 1977); 18.2 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. at 805.
200. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 885-89.
201. See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395
(D.D.C. 1992); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 756 (D. Haw. 1990); see
also People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Department of Health and Hu-
man Servs., 917 F.2d 15, 17 (9th Cir. 1990) (granting summary judgment against
animal rights activists who failed to identify specific portions of a large metropolitan
area they used that were threatened by a federal agency's failure to prepare EISs
before awarding grants to institutions involved in animal research).
Several commentators have similarly construed Lujan as requiring a more
strenuous geographical nexus standard. See, e.g., Hays, supra note 123, at 1014-17;
(noting difficulty of applying geographical nexus requirement in a NEPA action when
the location of the harm may not be known until an EIS has been prepared); Tac
Pan Ho, supra note 123, at 122; ("the [post-Lujan] Court now may refuse to hear
claims based on harm extending from the point of its origin and may require actual
present use of the exact geographical location of the harm's source."); Katherine B.
Steur & Robin L. Juni, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs: Standing Doctrine
in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (1991) ("the grava-
men of the injury in fact test in Lujan becomes the question of geographical specifici-
ty, that is, whether the land used by the plaintiffs members corresponds to the land
affected by the challenged agency actions").
202. Greenpeace, 748 F. Supp. at 756 (discussed infra notes 215-19 and accompany-
ing, text).
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the plaintiff and many other persons suffer similar harm,"' or
that such a plaintiff only has standing if the area the plaintiff
uses is subject to particularly severe harm. °4 An even more
disturbing opinion indicated that the plaintiff mus have a geo-
graphical nexus to the area of the challenged gover-nment ac-
tion, not the area of adverse impacts.0 5
As discussed below, these cases misconstrue the geographical
nexus requirement by treating it as some additional, indetermi-
nate standing requirement rather than as what it is-simply a
gloss on the injury in fact requirement when the plaintiff is
basing her claim of standing on injury to her use and enjoy-
ment of a certain area of land."' Moreover, these cases ignore
the implications of the Supreme Court's observation in Lujan
that parties adversely affected by a single administrative action
with broad effects would have standing to challenge that ac-
tion.0 7  Consequently, the geographical nexus requirement
should not preclude standing for any plaintiff who can dem-
onstrate that her use and enjoyment of a specified area of land
has been adversely affected by an agency's failure to comply
with the programmatic EIS requirement.
1. The Origins of the "Geographical Nexus" Requirement
The term "geographical nexus" first appeared in NEPA case
law in City of Davis v. Coleman."' In City of Davis, a city in
California challenged the Secretary of Transportation's decision
not to prepare an EIS on a proposed freeway exchange.0 9 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the risk that
203. See City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 484-85.
204. Id.
205. See Foundation on Economic Trends, 794 F. Supp. at 401 (discussed infra
notes 229-32 and accompanying text).
206. One commentator has suggested that because the Supreme Court has not
always focused upon the precise geographical area used by environmental plaintiffs,
the geographical nexus requirement can be interpreted as a prudential limitation on
standing rather than as an aspect of the constitutional and statutory injury in fact
requirement. See Hays, supra note 203, at 1015-16. As Justice Scalia has noted, how-
ever, the constitutional source of the courts' authority to impose purely "prudential"
limitations on standing is unclear. Scalia, supra note 70, at 885-86.
207. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-91 n.2.
208. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
209. Id. at 665-66.
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serious environmental impacts will be overlooked because of the
failure to prepare an EIS was "a sufficient 'injury in fact' to
support standing, provided this injury is alleged by a plaintiff
having a sufficient geographical nexus to the site of the chal-
lenged project that he may be expected to suffer whatever envi-
ronmental consequences the project may have."21° The court of
appeals acknowledged that this was a "broad test"21" ' but not-
ed that such a standard was necessary because "the nature and
scope of environmental consequences are often highly uncertain
before [an EIS has been prepared]."" 2 Subsequent cases have
approved this rationale and stressed the necessary liberality of
the geographical nexus requirement."'
2. Post-Lujan Geographical Nexus Analysis
Some of the cases that have referenced the geographical
nexus requirement since Lujan was decided have raised several
novel suggestions about Lujan's impact on the geographical
nexus requirement: that a plaintiff no longer has standing to
challenge an agency's compliance with NEPA with regard to a
federal action with environmental impacts covering a much
broader area than that used by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff
only has standing if the impacts of the federal action are par-
ticularly severe on the area of land he actually uses, or even
that the plaintiff must have a geographical nexus to the federal
210. Id. at 671.
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also Hays, supra note 123, at 1016 (noting the uncertainty of time
and place of environmental harm prior to the preparation of an EIS). But see Wilder-
ness Soc'y v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denying standing to environmental
plaintiffs who failed to identify specific areas of land they used that would be affected
by proposed transfers of federal land in Alaska to the state of Alaska and native
corporations).
213. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. United States Navy, 841 F.2d 927, 932 (9th
Cir. 1988); South East Lake View Neighbors v. Department of Housing and Urban
Dev., 685 F.2d 1027, 1039 (7th Cir. 1982); California ex rel. Younger v. Andrus, 608
F.2d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 1979); Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative,
822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
685 (1994); United States v. 18.2 Acres of Land, 442 F. Supp. 800, 805 (E.D. Cal.
1977); see also Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that residents of one state with a gypsy moth problem had sufficient geo-
graphical nexus to challenge the adequacy of an EIS prepared on a national gypsy
moth eradication program).
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action itself rather than the harm caused by the federal ac-
tion. 14 As discussed below, however, these cases fail to ad-
dress either the traditional injury in fact analysis or the proce-
dural nature of NEPA's mandate.
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
suggested that Lujan had imposed a more stringent geographic-
al nexus standard on environmental harm plaintiffs in Green-
peace, U.SA. v. Stone.215 In Greenpeace, the plaintiffs brought
suit under NEPA seeking to enjoin the United States Army
from transporting a stockpile of nerve gas from Germany to an
atoll in the Pacific Ocean where the nerve gas was to be de-
stroyed.216 Addressing the plaintiffs' standing, the district
court noted that although the Ninth Circuit had traditionally
applied a liberal geographical nexus standard, the Lujan hold-
ing "appears to heighten the requirements for establishing actu-
al injury for purposes of standing under NEPA ... 217 Al-
though the court found it unnecessary to decide the issue,218 it
indicated that even under the "broad" geographical nexus stan-
dard, the plaintiffs might have trouble establishing injury in
fact for the transoceanic portion of the proposed action.219
In City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration," the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that an organization could demonstrate geo-
graphical nexus to redress widely shared harm so long as the
threatened harm would "personally affect" the organization's
membersY The plaintiffs had challenged the decision of the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) not
to prepare a "cumulative" environmental impact statement on
its corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for auto-
mobiles.=2
214. See infra notes 215-32 and accompanying text.
215. 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
216. Id. at 752-53.
217. Id. at 756.
218. Id. The court avoided ruling on the standing issue by finding on the merits
that the defendants had not violated NEPA. Id. at 757-65.
219. Id. at 756.
220. 912 F.2d 478.
221. Id. at 494.
222. Id. at 482-83.
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One of the plaintiffs, the Natural Resources Defense Council
(NRDC), argued that the NHTSA's refusal to prepare an EIS
created the risk that the NHTSA would not adequately consider
a lower CAFE standard. Consequently, the increase in fossil
fuel combustion would contribute to global warming, causing a
rise in sea levels which would damage coastal areas of Califor-
nia, where many members of NRDC lived. " 3 In support of
their assertion of standing, NRDC submitted an affidavit from
one of its members who lived, recreated, and farmed in
California."4 The court of appeals rejected the argument that
the geographical nexus requirement precluded standing because
of the widespread nature of global warming, holding that
NRDC satisfied the standing requirement by "demonstrat[ing]
that failure to prepare an EIS explaining the effects of the
rollbacks on global warming presents the risk of overlooking an
environmental injury that will personally affect its
members."2 5
Other language in City of Los Angeles, however, could be
read to find injury in fact to challenge geographically wide-
spread harm only in instances in which the plaintiffs live in
areas where the harm would be particularly severe. 6 The
court of appeals noted that (according to affidavits submitted by
NRDC) "the implications of the greenhouse effect for California
are 'particularly grave,"'227 and concluded that "[a]lthough the
effects of a change in global atmosphere would obviously be felt
throughout this country, and indeed the world, NRDC has sat-
isfied the geographical nexus requirement of NEPA standing by
showing the likelihood of particularly devastating consequences
to NRDC members in California."2 8 Thus it is unclear to
what extent the court of appeals' finding of standing was de-
pendent upon the "particularly devastating consequences" of
global warming in California, or whether, for example, it would
have found standing if the NRDC had relied upon the adverse
effects of its members who live in Kansas.
223. Id. at 494.
224. Id.
225. Id. (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 457 U.S. 871 (1990)).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. (citing Oregon Envtl. Council v. Kunzman, 817 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1987)).
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An opinion in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia went even further, suggesting that under
NEPA the geographical nexus must actually be to the major
federal action which is the subject of the EIS, not the potential
environmental harm caused by the major federal action. In
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins,229 the district
court rejected the plaintiffs claim that he had standing to chal-
lenge the government's failure to consider the effects of various
government actions on global warming in NEPA documents
because the rising water levels which would allegedly be caused
by global warming would adversely affect his use and enjoy-
ment of certain eastern seashore areas."s The court stated
that the plaintiff had not alleged a sufficient nexus to the var-
ious government activities which were allegedly contributing to
global warming,"3 and the opinion further indicated that the
plaintiff lacked standing because "the Supreme Court [in Lujan]
has made it abundantly clear that a litigant may no longer
obtain across-the-board, nationwide correction of agency actions
under the APA simply because his use of one locality may be
adversely affected. " "
229. 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992).
230. Id. at 400. The court also rejected the argument by the plaintiff and two
plaintiff organizations that they had "informational standing" based upon the harm to
their information dissemination activities by the government's failure to address glob-
al climate change in NEPA documents. Id. at 398-99.
231. Id. at 400 (citing City of Los Angeles, 912 F.2d at 492).
232. Id. at 401, (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)). The
court also indicated that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that his alleged envi-
ronmental injury was "fairly traceable" to the government actions at issue. Id.
A different judge of the same court, however, came to a contrary conclusion on
the geographical nexus issue in Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative,
822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 5 F.3d 549, (D.C. Cir. 1993),
cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). In Public Citizen, several environmental and con-
sumer organizations challenged the failure of the Office of the United States Trade
Representative to prepare an EIS on the proposed North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). 822 F. Supp. at 23. The plaintiffs argued that the NAFTA
would cause injury in fact to its members because it could result in the modification
of certain domestic environmental and health laws, contribute to the deterioration of
the border region between Mexico and the United States, and adversely affect the air
quality of certain urban areas. 822 F. Supp. at 27-28 & nn. 7-8.
The court rejected the argument that these adverse affects were "too wide-
spread" to satisfy the geographical nexus requirement, noting that "the absence of a
geographical nexus does not defeat a claim of standing because that 'Would mean that
the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by no-
body.' . . . Thus, the Court concludes that standing is proper where the allegations of
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The suggestion in these cases that plaintiffs may not have
standing to challenge the failure to comply with NEPA's EIS
requirement with regard to major federal actions affecting large
areas of land is particularly problematic for programmatic EIS
plaintiffs, because a programmatic EIS typically addresses large
areas of land and affects many people. The bases of the courts'
conclusions about the implications of Lujan for the geographical
nexus standard, however, are unclear. The cases neither explain
exactly how the Lujan decision imposed a more stringent geo-
graphical nexus requirement nor cite the same section of Lujan
in support of their geographical nexus discussion."
Three primary factors, however, appear to have contributed
to the misinterpretation of the Lujan decision's implications for
the geographical nexus requirement. First, as with the agency
action and finality issues discussed above, these cases appear to
misconstrue the geographical nexus requirement in the NEPA
context because they fail to properly identify the issuance of an
allegedly flawed EIS or the decision not to prepare an EIS 'as
the agency action subject to review. Thus these cases do not
account for the broad scope of environmental impacts and indi-
viduals who are potentially affected by that single agency ac-
tion. Similarly, they fail to address Justice Scalia's ac-
knowledgement in Lujan that an agency action under section
702 of the APA which has broad effects is nonetheless subject
to judicial review." 4
Second, the cases advocating a heightened geographical nexus
requirement do not analyze the geographical nexus standard as
an aspect of the "injury in fact" standing requirement. Conse-
quently, they fail to address the procedural nature of the harm
which NEPA is intended to prevent-the increased chance of
environmental harm that results from uninformed decision-
making. Thus, the relevant inquiry should be whether the
environmental harm to particular members of the Plaintiff organizations are suffi-
ciently concrete." 822 F. Supp. at 28-29 (citing United States v. SCRAP (SCRAP I),
412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
233. See City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d
478, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Watkins, 794 F. Supp. at 401 (citing Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)); Greenpeace, USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749,
756-57 (D. Haw. 1990) (citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990)).
234. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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alleged failure to comply with NEPA's EIS requirement has in-
creased the risk of harm to land used and enjoyed by the plain-
tiff, even if the plaintiff only uses one portion of the potentially
affected land. That more land is involved and that other people
may also be adversely affected do not reduce the injury to the
plaintiff, as noted by the Supreme Court in SCRAP I: "[s]tand-
ing is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the
same injury." 235
Similarly, the suggestion in Watkins that the geographical
nexus must be to the federal action itself and not the area
where the effects of the action are felt fails to address geo-
graphical nexus as injury in fact. The function of the geograph-
ical nexus test is to ensure that a plaintiff has suffered actual
injury to her use of adversely affected land. Consequently, it is
the location of the harm, not the activity causing the harm,
which is relevant. A party challenging a chemical factory's pol-
lution of a river, for instance, need not demonstrate that it uses
and enjoys the area where the factory is located, instead it
need only demonstrate that it uses and enjoys an adversely
affected portion of the river.236
Another hazard of the failure to analyze the geographical
nexus doctrine within the context of injury in fact is that it
obscures an inescapable limitation on the applicability of the
doctrine: it only applies when the plaintiff is alleging injury in
fact to her use and enjoyment of land. If a plaintiff uses and
enjoys a resource at a location unrelated to the location where
the harm to that resource is initially occurring, the plaintiffs
geographical relationship to the location of that harm is ir-
relevantY7 In National Organization for the Reform of Mari-
235. United States v. SCRAP (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 6369, 687 (1973).
236. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972); Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir.
1990) (citing SCRAP I, 412 U.S. at 689 n.14); Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated
Rail Co., 768 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1985).
237. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2154 (1992) ("[mlany
environmental injuries . .. cause harm distant from the area immediately affected by
the challenged action .... It cannot seriously be contended that a litigant's failure
to use the precise or exact site where animals are slaughtered or where toxic waste
is dumped into a river means he or she cannot show injury.") (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); see also Roberta J. Borchardt, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Unwarranted Judi-
cial Interference with Congressional Power and Environmental Protection, 1993 Wisc.
L. REV. 1337, 1367-68 (1993). Hays, supra note 123, at 1014-15 (noting that courts do
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juana Laws (NORML) v. United States Department of State, s
for example, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that an organization which advocates the legal-
ization of marijuana had standing to challenge the failure to
prepare an EIS on the United States' participation in the
spraying of herbicides on marijuana in Mexico. The court did
not require any geographical nexus between the plaintiffs and
the action in Mexico, instead it found standing based upon the
plaintiffs allegations of "health, recreational and informational
injuries."239 Thus the geographical nexus standard should only
preclude review when a plaintiff is relying solely upon her use
and enjoyment of land to establish standing and cannot dem-
onstrate that the challenged action may harm the land she uses
and enjoys.
The final factor underlying the interpretation of Lujan as
imposing a more demanding geographical nexus standard is the
apparent concern that granting parties standing to challenge
widely shared harm could result in adjudication of generalized
grievances rather than specific cases."0 The Supreme Court's
reluctance to adjudicate generalized grievances, however, did
not prevent it from finding in SCRAP I that the plaintiffs had
standing based upon injury which was admittedly "wide-
spread."" 1
not focus on geographical nexus when the plaintiff is claiming an economic or
preservational injury).
238. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
239. Id. at 1230. The court seemed particularly impressed with NORML's claim of
injury to its information dissemination activities. See id. at 1230 (citing Scientists'
Institute for Pub. Info. Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1973)). As noted above, however, the status of "informational standing" has
been called into question by some recent opinions. See supra note 129. Nonetheless, if
and to the extent that harm to an organization's information dissemination activities
remains a viable basis for standing, the geographical relationship of the plaintiffs to
the challenged major federal action or resulting environmental harm in such cases
would clearly be irrelevant. See Lawrence Gerschwer, Informational Standing Under
NEPA Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 996, 1017-18, 1038 (1993) (discussing the logical inapplicability of a geographical
nexus requirement to informational standing plaintiffs).
240. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912
F.2d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., dissenting on standing issue);
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D.D.C. 1992).
241. SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. at 688; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130, 2147 (1992) ("it does not matter how many persons have been injured by the
challenged action [if] the party bringing suit [can] show that the action injures him
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Moreover, the mere breadth of the class of persons adversely
affected does not normally preclude standing to sue for individ-
ual members of that class. 2 The courts will permit class ac-
tion suits, for example, even when the proposed class which the
plaintiff purports to represent includes over one million individ-
uals."3 Similarly, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
the suggestion that the members of a plaintiff class must live
within a limited geographical area.' Consequently, as long as
a plaintiff can demonstrate that an agency's failure to prepare
an adequate programmatic EIS has increased the risk that a
natural resource (including but not necessarily limited to land)
will be adversely affected, he is entitled to judicial review re-
gardless of how many other persons are also potentially harmed
and notwithstanding any vague prohibition against the adjudi-
cation of "generalized grievances."245
in a concrete and personal way") (Kennedy, J., concurring); Center for Auto Safety v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("(t)he
question of how many suffer from an injury is logically unrelated to the question of
whether there is an injury and has nothing to do with the fitness of a party to bring
a claim"). Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 836, 848 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that "plain-
tiffs are not limited to asserting unique economic or physical injuries, but may also
seek judicial relief to challenge environmental, esthetic and other sorts of non-econom-
ic injuries which are widely shared").
242. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1470 (1988) (noting that companies or members of an industry
would have standing to challenging a carcinogen regulation affecting them regardless
of how many other affected parties existed).
243. See Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 534-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
see also Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 19, 20 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (finding sheer
size of class need not defeat a class action); Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance v.
United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 69 F.R.D. 633, 638 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(finding nationwide class certifiable).
244. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
245. One commentator has suggested that the distinction between a mere "general-
ized complaint" and harm sufficient to support standing which is incidentally wide-
spread concerns principles of separation of powers which are not implicated in envi-
ronmental litigation:
The deciding factor appears to be whether the Court believes that it is
encroaching on the territory of another government branch. Most often,
this encroachment will occur in suits involving areas especially sensitive
to federalism claims, such as fiscal and military operations. Environmen-
tal and other actions, in which the injury seems distinct and the remedy
clear, are less likely to present problems.
2 CHARLEs H. KOCH, JR., ADmNTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.8 (1985); see also
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (referring to "the rule barring adjudication
of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branch-
es . . .") In Justice Scalia's view, however, the prohibition against the adjudication
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V. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the confusion in the federal courts over
the implications of the Lujan decision for judicial review of
agency compliance with NEPA's programmatic EIS requirement
is largely attributable to the court's failure to properly identify
both the nature of the agency action at issue under NEPA and
the nature of the harm that NEPA is intended to prevent. Once
it is understood that the decision not to prepare an EIS or the
issuance of an allegedly flawed EIS is the agency action subject
to review and that the harm which NEPA is intended to pre-
vent is the increased risk of environmental harm caused by
uninformed decisionmaking, the problems of agency action,
finality and geographical nexus would seem to present no more
problems for plaintiffs seeking an adequate programmatic EIS
than for any other NEPA plaintiff.246
Unfortunately, however, something more than obscure points
of environmental and administrative law appear to be involved
in the increasing reluctance of the courts to enforce the pro-
grammatic EIS requirement. Some lower federal courts seem to
be taking their cue not so much from Justice Scalia's analysis
in Lujan, but instead from the hostile tone of his discussion of
environmental litigation addressing broad public policy is-
sues." 7 Nonetheless, despite Justice Scalia's apparent antipa-
of generalized grievances clearly extends to environmental litigation.
246. Some recent decisions have, in fact, held agency compliance with the program-
matic EIS requirement to be reviewable. See, e.g., Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d
1394, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1983) (granting plaintiffs standing to challenge Forest
Service's programmatic EIS on its management program for a national forest); Public
Servs. Comm'n v. Andrus, 825 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Idaho 1993) (reviewing Department
of Energy's decision not to prepare an EIS on its program for transporting and stor-
ing spent nuclear fuel in Idaho); Sierra Club v. Espy, 822 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Texas
1993) (reviewing Forest Service's EIS on its management program for a national
forest); Colorado Envtl. Coalition v. Lujan, 803 F. Supp. 364 (D.Colo. 1992); Portland
Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Or. 1992); Sierra Club v. Robertson,
764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991); see also Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp.
852, 862-64 (D.D.C. 1991) (rejecting claim that Department of Energy was required to
prepare a programmatic EIS on the importation of spent fuel rods from foreign na-
tions, but approving concept of programmatic EISs).
The Congress has also recently indicated that it appreciates the significance
and utility of programmatic EISs by requiring the preparation of a programmatic EIS
on California's "Central Valley Project" water distribution system. See Pub. L. No.
102-575, § 3409, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
247. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890-94. While still on the United States Court of Ap-
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thy for public interest environmental litigation, there is little
doctrinal support for the wholesale preclusion of judicial review
of agency compliance with NEPA's programmatic EIS require-
ment. When reduced to the principles of agency action, finality
and geographical nexus, the chimera of impermissible "program-
matic review" quickly disappears.
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Scalia complained in a law review
article about "the judiciary's long love affair with environmental litigation." Scalia,
supra note 70, at 884.
1994] 667

